Never-ending war: Why Israel will ultimately have to deal with the Palestinian question

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Israel believed that integrating itself more into the Middle East by striking deals with its Arab neighbours would have marginalised Iranian-backed extremist groups, but its conflict with the Palestinians remains its biggest hurdle read more

 Why Israel will ultimately have to deal with the Palestinian question

The Israeli Iron Dome missile defence system (left) intercepts rockets fired from Gaza Strip. (Representative Photo, Credit: Anas Baba/AFP)

The war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip is now over ten months old, and in spite of the near destruction of Gaza and the deaths of thousands of civilians, there seems to be no end in sight.

That the war was unlikely to be contained within the local geography was a given, but the extent to which the war would escape the local geography was subject to speculation. Soon military escalations were spreading across the region. There were clashes on the Israeli-Lebanese border between the Hezbollah and Israelis, Houthi assaults in the Red Sea disrupting a vital shipping route, attacks by Iranian-aligned militias against US forces in Iraq and Syria, and even missile attacks between Israel and Iran.

There were ups and downs as regards the violent attacks, but, within the space of 24 hours at the end of last month, Israel took responsibility for the assassination of Fuad Shukr, a top Hezbollah commander, in Beirut in retaliation for a Hezbollah rocket attack in the Golan Heights. Israel was apparently involved in the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s political leader, in Tehran, and the very next day it was declared that Muhammad Dief had been killed in an air strike in Gaza in mid-July. Observers across the globe feared an escalation that could lead to a catastrophic regional war.

The Reasons for Escalation

Why is Israel now escalating the conflict in such a manner? While the country has a lengthy record of assassinating Palestinian leaders and has killed hundreds of Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon and Syria, hence its latest attacks are not unprecedented.

Israel has also long demonstrated intelligence capabilities that allow it to penetrate deep inside Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and some other countries in the region. Apart from that, it is confident that the previous rounds of escalation over the past ten months have not led to an all-out regional war. However, on the contrary, the eventual de-escalation and containment of a conflict cannot be taken for granted. Actions favouring restraint can be overtaken by events on the ground and public outcry leading to a wider conflict.

Israel had vowed to eliminate the Hamas leadership, and with the double blow now Yahya Sinwar remains the last man standing. Prime Minister Netanyahu may now have delivered part of what he promised. However, the tempo and nature of the latest Israeli strikes have increased the risk of more serious escalation. The back-to-back assassinations of Shukr and Haniyeh may now trigger Iran and possibly the other armed proxy groups it backs, to retaliate.

Details of the assassinations in the media, including social media, no doubt highlight Israel’s abilities to launch militarily and technologically sophisticated attacks deep within enemy territory. This gives the impression that the Israeli military is now on the front foot.

Conversely, the reality may be different, as there is also a school of thought that states that Israel may be pushing the limits in its regional actions not because it feels strong but because it feels weak after October 7, when Hamas dealt a devastating blow to its deterrence posture. Now, Israel is willing to assume greater risks and absorb higher costs. Assassinations and the ability to carry out precision strikes now form part of its deterrence.

Israel Post-October 7

There is no doubt that Israel’s psyche has changed since October 7, 2023. Before Hamas’s attack, Israel’s confidence had reached a peak. It had come to believe that the Arab states would accept Israel even if it had not resolved its conflict with the Palestinians. Further, it felt that it could strike Iran and its allies virtually without consequences or jeopardising the support it enjoyed from the US.

It believed in its hard power, including the most basic assumption: that their military and technological superiority could deter their adversaries and that their intelligence capabilities were one of its greatest force multipliers. They could thus live securely behind smart walls and fortified borders and could prosper economically without compromising regarding peace with the Palestinians.

But within a matter of a few hours on October 7, that confidence was shattered and transformed into a sense of vulnerability. The Hamas attack overturned the dominant feeling in its people that “Israel is strong and invincible”.

Many Israelis were furious with their own government for its massive security failures. There soon emerged a trust deficit against the current leadership. A large number of people now believe that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is prolonging the war for his political survival, and citizens across the spectrum blame him for the failed policies and security lapses that allowed the Hamas attacks to take place.

The Israel Defence Forces are stretched on multiple fronts, from Gaza to the West Bank to Lebanon and Syria, and also have to counter the threat from Iran and the Houthis in Yemen. Domestically, Netanyahu’s contentious attempt to overhaul the country’s judiciary in the first half of 2023 created serious fissures in Israeli society, with many Israeli reservists threatening that they would not report for duty. This threatened to trigger a constitutional crisis between the judicial and legislative branches of government. Those divisions were largely put aside after the Hamas attack.

The deep fissures in Israeli society also came out in the open on 28 July when Israeli protesters, including far-right members of the Knesset, clashed with military police at an Israeli base where nine soldiers accused of raping a Palestinian prisoner are being held pending their trial. Some Israelis called it one of their most distressing days, while right-wing Israeli lawmakers, including those from the ruling Likud, have justified the rape of Hamas prisoners, claiming it is legitimate due to the atrocities committed during the October 7 attacks.

Then there is the criticism against Israel, which is evident even on the streets of their most ardent supporters, the US and UK. The feeling is that innocent Palestinians are being targeted, and even hospitals, schools, and aid workers are not being spared. The latest being the death of over 100 students at al-Tabin school in the Daraj in Gaza City.

Turkey, a NATO member, has now joined South Africa’s case accusing Israel of genocide at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In fact, the interim judgement given in January this year spoke of “the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible “. The ICJ order brought hope that justice might prevail, but when nothing changed, there is a loss of faith. The truth is that the international system lacks an enforcement agency, particularly when a member of the security council is directly involved or backs a party in the conflict.

As the war continues, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has come under increasing international pressure regarding the escalating Palestinian death toll, and Israel is being accused of genocide. This is damaging its image and reputation. On the other hand, there is domestic pressure to secure the return of all Israelis still held in Gaza.

Conflicting Realities

The Israel-Palestine conflict has long been described as one of victimhood, which is dominant in the narratives of both Israelis and Palestinians. With the State of Israel emerging in the aftermath of the Holocaust, along with the mass displacement of indigenous Palestinians in the Nakba, or ‘catastrophe’. The trauma of those events has been passed on to subsequent generations and still deeply pervades both societies. Edward Said’s ‘Out of Place’ regarding an irrecoverable past and the loss of his homeland brings out the feelings of those who have been uprooted.

Though the events themselves are historical events that predate the lives of most members of both populations. But these sentiments have contributed to the present mutually exclusive claims, which have made the Israeli-Palestinian conflict intractable. The October 7 attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza have brought those traumas to a head for the current generation.

A Shadow War Out in the Open 

Iran’s 13 April attack on Israel was telling. Israel clearly miscalculated when it targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel at a facility in Damascus. It did not anticipate a direct response involving hundreds of drones and missiles launched from Iranian territory at Israel. The war between Iran and Israel was largely fought in the shadows. The Iranians decided to take it open.

While a sophisticated and coordinated defence, which included the US, repelled the assault, there was a sense of alarm and concern that the next such assault may not be so easily repelled. Israel’s response targeting Isfahan, the site of Iran’s uranium conversion plant, was calibrated to avoid casualties while showing Israel can penetrate Iran’s defences and strike any target it seeks to hit.

But there are concerns that Iran and its proxies are gaining in strength and that Iran may push to accelerate its nuclear capabilities if Tehran believes it is not sufficiently able to deter Israel through conventional means.

The Arab States seem to have gone against the famous adage attributed to Arab thinker Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406): ‘Arabs have agreed to always disagree.’ Palestine is no longer the cause that unites the Arab world, and Shia Iran seems to have taken the lead in defending the Palestinian cause. Amongst the reasons being that Syria is almost sapped by its internal conflict and that Egypt and Jordan, the Arab neighbours of Israel, feel that peace is better than combat. While Saudi Arabia’s repeated declarations state that there can be no official normalisation with Israel unless a Palestinian state is created. While they criticised Israel for its war in Gaza and demanded an immediate cease-fire, there has been no punitive action.

Conclusion

Impressive tactical military operations and precision strikes against Hamas leadership may give the illusion of victory, but only an enduring peace with the Palestinians can bring real security. The conflict may presently be raging, but at some point, engagement will again be necessary. When that time comes, both sides will need to take into account the sharply changed realities and perceptions in both communities. Unfortunately, most Israelis and Palestinians have hardened positions motivated both by revenge and survival.

But the reality of its vulnerability is now compelling Israel’s actions in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria even if they increase the risk of a wider regional war, as it has a feeling of security due to its backing by the US. This backing was evident even in Japan when the US Ambassador did not attend the nuclear day memorial function in Nagasaki as Israel was not invited.

Ending the war in Gaza would certainly help reduce the problems in the region, but the current round of escalation is unlikely to bring a cease-fire deal or the release of the remaining Israeli hostages any closer. Israel believed that integrating itself more into the Middle East by striking deals with its Arab neighbours would have marginalised Iranian-backed extremist groups, but its conflict with the Palestinians remains its biggest hurdle.

The vision for peace will need to engage with these colliding, incompatible realities.

The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.

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