No plan, no warning system, no coordination: Probe reveals Israeli Army's failures to stop Hamas massacres

The Israeli investigation into the deadliest Hamas massacre during the October 7 attacks has revealed a series of systematic as well as battlefield- and commander-level errors that enabled terrorists to kill and abduct more than 100 people.

On October 7, 2023, around 3,000 terrorists from Hamas and allied terrorist groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) invaded Israel and went on a rampage across the southern part of the country. The waves of terrorists attacked border communities, towns, and even overran military bases and outposts. Overall, they killed at least 1,200, injured more than 6,000, and abducted 251 people.

In the deadliest attack at the kibbutz of Be’eri, the terrorists killed a total of 132 people and abducted 32 people and took them to Gaza as hostages. Those killed included 101 civilians and 31 security personnel.

The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on Thursday released the report into the investigation conducted into attack and the response. The investigation found glaring lapses in both the security planning prior to the attack and the response once the attack had begun. Cowardice of commanders as well as a slew of tactical mistakes by soldiers were also found.

‘IDF failed in its mission’

The investigation concluded that the IDF “failed in its mission to protect the residents of Kibbutz Be’eri”, according to The Times of Israel.

The investigation found that there were systematic failures that led to the massacre at Be’eri.

The probe found that the Israeli military had never prepared for an attack like the one that occurred on October 7 as their entire approach to border security and the defence of the region was based on the idea that terrorist could only mound “single intrusions” and never the massive attack that they did on October 7, according to the newspaper.

Such a lack of preparedness was there despite the Israeli military possessing intelligence that Hamas was preparing for widespread terrorist attack .

The newspaper further reported that the report found that the local security team of Be’eri was not give appropriate warnings. It further indicted the military for not being able to piece together the complete picture of the crises at Be’eri in the initial hours of the attack even as the local security team had informed the military of the attack.

No coordination, no leadership, no battlefield plan

The investigation further found that the military could not establish a functional command and control system in the first hours.

A number of units started converging at Be’eri as there was little coordination between troops, according to the investigation reported by the paper.

The investigation further found that these troops kept accumulating outside of the Be’eri but did not immediately engage in fighting. This delayed the fighting with the terrorists and gave them more time to carry out their attacks.

Some of the troops did not fight terrorists as they were ordered to evacuate civilians and others originally fought inside Be’eri but then retreated to evacuate the wounded, said the report, adding that soldiers also waited for their commanders to arrive in some cases before entering Be’eri to fight the terrorists.

Such a chaotic response continued till evening as commanders were briefing troops before entering to avoid friendly fire, which also caused a large build-up outside Be’eri, according to the paper.

The Jerusalem Post separately reported that the investigation found that Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, the commander of the Gaza division, fled the battlefield and that meant there was no one left to coordinate the response to the attack by Hamas.

The probe also criticised units that retreated and emphasised the “need for a spirit of risking one’s life to confront enemy forces to protect civilians”, according to the paper.